Editorial : China’s block: on not listing Azhar as global terrorist

Its decision on Masood Azhar is shocking — but India must keep up persuasive diplomacy
China’s decision to block(बाधा/आड़) the listing of Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist at the UN Security Council is both a setback

to India’s post-Pulwama diplomatic(कूटनीतिक ) strategy(रणनीति) and a reality check on ties with China at present. After the February 14 attack, claimed(दावा किया/अधियाचित) by the JeM, the government had made the listing of Azhar a focus in its diplomatic efforts(प्रयासों/कोशिशें). It reached out to several(कई ) governments, andshared(साझा किया) a dossier on Azhar with each member of the Security Council, who are all members of the 1267 ISIL and al-Qaeda sanctions committee. A special effort was made with Beijing, which has blocked the Azhar listing in the past, including(समेत/सहित) just after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. From 2016 to 2018, India’s proposals(प्रस्तावों/सुझाव) to list Azhar, with evidence(सबूत/प्रमाण) of JeM involvement(भागीदारी/फसाव) in the Pathankot airbase attack, were also foiled(नाकाम/विफल करना) by China, which placed holds on the listing, and then vetoed it. The vetoes came despite(बावजूद ) the fact that the JeM is banned, and in the UNSC listing it is noted that Azhar, as its leader and founder, accepted funds from Osama bin Laden. China, as the one country that has refused(अस्वीकृत/मना कर दिया) to allow Azhar’s name on the list, is well aware of the evidence against(खिलाफ) him, but is not ready to withdraw its objections(आपत्तियों/एतराज़) . It is clear that despite India-China relations improving(सुधार/अच्छा करना) after the Wuhan summit in April 2018, China is unwilling(तैयार नहीं/अनिच्छुक) to align(पंक्ति में होना/श्रेणीबद्ध) itself with India on its concerns(चिंताओं/मामला) on cross-border terrorism emanating(निकलती/निर्गत होना) from Pakistan.

China’s stand is regrettable(खेदजनक) and condemnable(निंदनीय), and it has been consistent(लगातार) on this issue(मुद्दे ).New Delhi must now consider whether it wishes to accept this as a fait accompli, or confront Beijing to try to persuade(राज़ी करना/कोशिश करने) it to change its stand by means of incentives(प्रोत्साहन ) or coercion(दबाव/जबरदस्ती). This is a challenge, as any kind of concerted(सामना किया) international pressure(अंतर्राष्ट्रीय दबाव ) from the Western countries in this regard( संबंध में) has in the past only served to be counterproductive(उल्टा/अनुत्पादक) . It is also unlikely that the suggestions(सुझाव )being offered by some political groups, of cutting imports from China and other punitive(दंडात्मक ) actions, will yield(उपज )much. The government may be more successful if it identifies(पहचानता ) the incentives it can offer China in the next few months to review(समीक्षा ) its position(स्थिति). While some of those incentives would be bilateral(द्विपक्षीय/अतिरिक्त), the Chinese spokesperson’s hint that dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad, and even(यहां तक) possible(संभव ) “triangular(त्रिकोणीय)” talks including Beijing, is indicative(सूचक/निर्देशक) of China’s thinking. The government must also not lose sight of the bigger picture: that the UNSC cannot enforce its own listings, and other leaders who have been sanctioned(स्वीकृत/अधिकृत करना) in the past remain free and unencumbered(अभारग्रस्त/भार रहित). While listing Azhar at the UNSC is an unfinished task, the larger issue remains: to ensure that Pakistan takes substantive(लगातार ) action(कार्रवाई)against Azhar, the JeM and other terror groups that are threatening(खतरा) India. China, with its economic andstrategic(रणनीतिक ) leverage(लाभ) with Pakistan, may be better-placed to help in this matter.